COLORADO’S EXPERIMENT WITH POPULISM

by Joel F. Vaile, The Forum vol. 18 (February 1895), pp. 714-723

PRIOR to the year 1892, Colorado was considered, on national issues at least, a reliable Republican State—in presidential elections always Republican. In 1882, and again in 1886, a Democratic governor was elected, but the other State officers were Republicans. The election of 1892, however, revealed a remarkable change of sentiment among the people; and the following analysis of the total vote for governor for each of four successive elections will furnish food for reflection:

It would appear from this table that the Democratic party has been almost obliterated in Colorado. It is a fact, however, that in the last election a great many Democrats voted the Republican ticket as the only practicable way of defeating Populismt—is notwithstanding the fact that in 1892 more than three-fourths of the Democratic party went over to the Populists, and that more than one-sixth of the Republicans did the same, with the result that Davis H. Waite was elected governor with a complete corps of Populist State officials. The Populist party did not, however, have equal success in the legislative elections of that year. In the house of representatives the Republicans had a majority. In the senate they had a plurality which could be overcome only by a combination of Populists and Democrats. Colorado’s experiment in Populism is, therefore, an experiment in administration, and not in law-making.

The Populist movement in Colorado is not identical, either in causes or development, with the corresponding movement in Kansas, Nebraska, and the South. The real influence which suddenly swelled the Populist vote from 6 per cent to 47 per cent of the total [p.715] vote of the State, is found not in the Ocala platform of the Farmers’ Alliance, nor in the vagaries of the Omaha platform, but in the attitude of the two great national parties on the question of bimetallism. The voters of Colorado of all parties are practically unanimous in the advocacy of bimetallism. Long prior to the National Conventions of 1892 there had developed an intense sentiment that the policy of gold monometallism was destructive not only to the interests of Colorado, but to manufacturing, producing, and commercial interests throughout the United States. In the hope of influencing national policy, “silver clubs” were organized throughout the State in the winter of 1891 and 1892, the members of which were pledged to vote for no presidential candidate who was not committed, and whose party was not committed, to the free coinage of silver. Delegates and organized committees labored with the Republicans at Minneapolis, and afterward with the Democrats at Chicago. Their efforts were fruitless. Then followed the Populist Convention at Omaha, with a declaration in favor of bimetallism, but with a demand for paper money, to be distributed in accordance with the subtreasury scheme of the Farmers’ Alliance, “or a better system” (noscitur ex sociis). Here, then, was a national party pledged to the free coinage of silver. Thousands of Colorado voters turned to it, not because they accepted its doctrines on other subjects—for they ignored them—but for the purpose of protesting against the attitude of the two dominant parties on the one subject of coinage. At the ensuing election the Weaver electors received a plurality of nearly 15,000 votes in Colorado, and the Populist candidate for governor was elected by a plurality of 5,436. Thus Colorado soon found herself subject to the full sway of a Populist régime.

From the foregoing statement it will be apparent that Populist ascendancy in Colorado was accidental. It did not represent the judgment of the great mass of citizens. The peculiar doctrines of the Populist party have no hold on those who, by their enterprise, their investments, and their labor, have done and are still doing so much to develop the wonderful and varied resources of the State. It was with a shock of surprise that vigorous and enterprising, albeit conservative, Colorado suddenly discovered that she had put her neck into the yoke of Populist control.

Since the character of a State administration must usually be, and in this case was, determined by the policy and conduct of the man who happened to be chief executive, it is fair to inquire whether [p.716] any peculiar or radical features should be attributed to the party and its principles, or to the idiosyncrasies of the man. After a gubernatorial career of nearly two years, Governor Waite sought a renomination. The State Convention of his party gave it to him with great unanimity and boundless enthusiasm. At the ensuing election he received more than 40 per cent of the total vote of the State. These facts can be considered only as an approval and ratification by his party of his public acts.

The dominant idea which permeates the Omaha Populist platform and its immediate predecessors is a concentrated paternalism. The Government ownership of railroads, of telegraph lines, of telephones; the reclamation by the Government of lands held by corporations and by aliens; the abolition of banks; the direct issue of full legal-tender paper money, not supported by a coin reserve; the lending of this money to the people on the security of “imperishable farm products” stored in Government warehouses—these are characteristic features of Populism. The party also appeals to and emphasizes class distinctions. It calls for a “union of the labor forces of the United States”; it declares that “if any will not work neither shall he eat”; it sees naught but wickedness in the two great parties, and alleges that “corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench.”

Colorado in its State administration under Governor Waite gave an illustration of the practical operation of these Populist principles. Paternalism manifested itself in the assumption that the Governor is “the Government.” Class distinctions were emphasized and increased by the announcement that the rich have had their day and turn about is fair play. The courts, if they differed from the executive in the construction of constitution or statutes, were corrupt usurpers. Under such influences the spirit of anarchy was fostered and grew apace, and the State was brought to the very verge of civil war. Is this indictment sustained by the facts?

In the first year of Governor Waite’s administration there is little that requires comment. His inaugural message, although colored by populistic sentiment, was a strong address, and as conservative as could be expected from a disciple of the Omaha creed. Its most radical feature, perhaps, was the recommendation that a railroad commission of three members be created, with power “to hear and determine complaints without recourse to the courts.”

The Governor’s intemperate utterances in the summer of 1893, [p.717] which gave to him and to his State an extended and unpleasant notoriety, have been unduly exaggerated. Words which, when taken with the context, show only a rhetorical but injudicious emphasis, have been construed as manifesting a spirit of bloodthirsty violence. Their practical effect, however, was to create in the outside world a distrust of Colorado, and among the conservative people of the State they created a feeling of apprehension as to what a Populist administration might do in the emergencies of the times. This apprehension was justified by subsequent events.

Under the laws of the State of Colorado the Governor appoints the three members of the Fire and Police Board of the city of Denver, and these appointments are made “with power of suspension or removal at any time for cause, to be stated in writing, but not for political reasons.” Under this provision of law, the Governor made, from time to time, various changes in the personnel of the Fire and Police Board. These changes resulted in considerable friction and some litigation. Finally the Governor attempted to remove two of his appointees, who denied his authority so to do. The merits of the controversy between the Populist Governor and his Populist appointees do not concern us. Suffice it to say, that these members of the Fire and Police Board claimed that the real reasons for their removal were political, and that the assigned cause was a mere pretense. They refused to surrender their offices until the right thereto should be judicially determined and, in the meanwhile, obtained an injunction restraining the new appointees from interfering with them in the discharge of their duties. It is doubtless true also that, in anticipation of armed attack, they prepared for armed resistance. It should be said, however, that these officials at all times averred that if it should be judicially determined that they were not entitled to their offices, they would immediately surrender them.

The slow-moving process of the courts, however, did not, in the opinion of the Governor, furnish an adequate remedy. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court had promptly upheld the executive power in a previous controversy over appointments to the same Board, the Governor determined to carry out his purposes by force. He construed his constitutional power “to execute the laws” as including the power to forcibly induct his appointees into office without the intervention of civil process. His views upon this subject can be best illustrated by extracts from his own official statement. He says [p.718]:

That by the constitution of the State of Colorado the undersigned is charged with the duty of executing the laws…. That, acting upon the belief that he was authorized to carry into effect any order of removal that he might make in conformity with law … the undersigned … as commander-in-chief of the militia of the State of Colorado, upon the 14th day of March, 1894, duly called upon a number of the military forces of the State of Colorado to assist in the enforcement of the laws of the State, and in the removal of said Orr and Martin from the positions so wrongfully held by them…. The said military force was directed to proceed to the said City Hall in the city of Denver, and demand of the said Orr and Martin that they vacate the offices and apartments so unlawfully withheld by them, and that they desist and refrain from further interference with, or control over, the officers and patrolmen of the Police Department of the city of Denver, or the officers of the Fire Department of the city of Denver.

After speaking of the preparations of Orr and Martin for armed resistance to this military demand, the Governor further states that he deemed it his duty to call upon all of the National Guard of the State of Colorado to place themselves under arms in their respective armories, subject to call.

“How great a matter a little fire kindleth!” A controversy over two petty municipal offices sets a whole State in uproar. Although the law provides ample machinery for the swift determination of titles to office, this machinery is not employed. A military demand is made, and military force is at once used to enforce the demand. Gatling and Napoleon guns are trained on the City Hall, and the military forces of the city are drawn up in battle array before it. The militia of the entire State are ordered to their respective armories to await the orders of the commander-in-chief; and, in the midst of the tempest, the Governor calls also for United States troops. The correspondence in the War Department of the United States will show some of these events in a peculiar light. The Governor calls for United States troops to assist him in “preserving order and preventing bloodshed.” Upon their arrival he demands that they be placed under his orders to assist him in “taking possession of the City Hall,” that is, to induct his appointees into office. He learns to his dismay that United States troops can be subjected to the command of no other than a United States officer, and that they can be used only for prevention, and not for aggression. He then requests their removal. But, under the judicious control of the wise and experienced commander of the Department of the Colorado, they remain, and by their presence constitute a protection against further violence, a guaranty of safety for life and property.

[p.719] Finally, under the urgent solicitation of citizens, and by the advice of General McCook, which we may well presume was supported by the moral effect of the presence of United States troops not subject to the orders of the Governor, the Governor was induced to submit the matter to the Supreme Court of the State, under a constitutional provision permitting the executive in certain contingencies to call upon that body for its opinion. It is a strange commentary upon this Populist administration that it should become necessary, in this year of grace 1894, for the Supreme Court to re-enunciate principles which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty. It is in the following manner that the Court commented on this strange proceeding:

Will it be contended that it is the duty of the chief executive of the State to install into office, by force, if necessary, every county, precinct, or municipal officer whom he may deem entitled to such office, in advance of the determination of any controversy that may arise concerning such office? A proposition so fraught with danger to every principle of free government cannot for a moment be entertained; and, if such power cannot be lawfully exercised by the Governor acting in his civil capacity, a fortiori is the use of military force to that end by him as commander-in-chief unauthorized…. We repeat that by no rule of construction can the power and duty imposed upon the Governor “to execute the laws” be held to authorize the forcible induction of an appointee into office….
      Monarchical and despotic governments can undoubtedly proceed more speedily than a representative government in the enactment, administration, and execution of the laws. Reasonable delay is the price we pay in order to secure the protection and vindication of personal and property rights under a government like ours; and when it is once conceded that the hardship resulting from such delay justifies a resort to the summary exercise of arbitrary power, either by the civil or military authority, then will justice be dethroned, and despotism or anarchy usurp her seat.

It may well be supposed that such display of military force in such a cause, the contempt expressed by the chief executive for the established courts, and his assumption of arbitrary power caused great ferment in the public mind, and greatly increased the difficulties and hardships of industrial and commercial life, already prostrated by the general pressure of the times.

But, under populistic misgovernment, even more serious troubles were imminent. As early as February, 1894, differences arose between miners and mine-owners at the great gold camp of Cripple Creek, resulting in a strike of the most virulent kind. At an early stage, this strike developed into armed opposition to any working of the mines except on terms dictated by the miners’ union. Later, mine bosses and foremen were driven away. Miners who advised concessions were in several instances grossly maltreated, in ways too [p.720] horrible to relate, and were ejected from the camp. From the inception of this trouble, the active and expressed sympathies of the Governor were on the side of the miners, and they were thereby emboldened to deeds of violence which certainly would not otherwise have been committed. Early in the strike, the sheriff in attempting to serve process was met with armed opposition, and after resorting to the usual means of assistance he called upon the Governor for aid. The militia were sent in response to this demand, but very soon afterward the Governor, publicly alleging that he had been deceived by the sheriff and by false representations had been induced to order out the military, withdrew them. From that time on the miners looked upon him as their champion. The conservative people of the State considered that the chief executive was aiding and abetting lawlessness.

There is no need to write a detailed account of the “Cripple Creek War.” It should be stated, however, that hundreds of honest miners took no part in, and had no sympathy with, the disgraceful proceedings that took place. Many of these were compelled to leave the camp until the “war” was over. Many others were, against their will, impressed into service. The evidence seems indisputable that many of the leaders of the movement were ex-convicts and known outlaws whose right to be called “miners” was doubtful. The authorities of El Paso County finally determined to enforce the law at all hazards, and the sheriff appointed a large number of deputies to assist him in so doing. The “miners” immediately extended their organization, gathered arms and ammunition, invaded private houses for the purpose of gathering munitions of war, and unceremoniously appropriated them wherever they found them. They stopped travelers on the highway and searched them for arms. They built fortifications on “Bull Hill,” and gathered a force variously estimated at from 1,000 to 1,800 armed men. At the first approach of deputies they blew up the shaft and shaft-houses of a large mine. A portion of their number went out to meet the deputies and made a night attack upon them, resulting in loss of life.

Now, what is the attitude of this Populist administration in the meanwhile? The Governor is openly and even over his own signature in the public press charging the Sheriff with gathering an unlawful assemblage, because he had included in his list of deputies men from other counties than El Paso. His Adjutant-General, who happens to be a lawyer, is appearing for and defending, in the [p.721] courts of El Paso County, certain of the “miners” who had been already arrested. The Governor’s private secretary, in a published interview, encourages the strikers in their resistance to law in words like these:

The majority of the men on Bull Hill are animated by the conviction that they represent a vital principle. They haven’t the slightest fear of death. There are scores of those men who believe that if they fall in the impending battle, their blood will be the seed which will redeem the cause of labor to the world.

It is during this period that the expression “D—n capital” is attributed to Governor Waite.

Finally a force of 1,000 armed deputies is gathered in camp a short distance from “Bull Hill,” and a battle seems imminent. At this stage of the proceedings the Governor visits “Bull Hill,” where he is cordially welcomed. Divers reports exist of his sayings and doings there, and, according to newspaper accounts, certain violent words which then dropped from his lips became a rallying-cry for the “Bull Hill” battalions. He finally came back bearing overtures of peace. He came as the ambassador of “The Free Coinage Miners’ Union, No. 19, W.F.M.A.,” duly appointed by writing bearing the seal of the order.

Under the active influence and pressure of certain citizens brought to bear on both parties, a compromise of the original differences was finally arrived at, and further bloodshed was avoided. After the agreement of compromise was reached, the Governor sent a strong body of militia to the scene of conflict, to stand between the belligerents, and with orders to strictly limit the number of arrests which the Sheriff should be permitted to make.

Throughout this proceeding the Populist Governor, in accordance with the spirit of the Omaha platform, seems to consider himself as representing not the whole people, but a special class; not employer and employee, but employee against employer; not labor and capital, but labor as against capital. He himself recognizes this fact and attempts to justify it. In a subsequent campaign speech, he remarked:

I said when I was elected Governor, and many times since, that in the administra­tion of my office I should look after the interest of, and legislate for, the laboring man and woman. Fault was found with me that this would be class legislation. Well, what if it is? Is it not the truth that for thirty years the two old parties have been legislating for the creditor class? It is true, and turn about is fair play.

Observe, in passing, that the Governor, having before assumed judicial [p.722] power, now assumes, perhaps unconsciously, that he can also exercise the duties of legislation. The trinity of governmental powers converge in him. This assumption that governmental policies, having swung to one side, must now, like a pendulum, swing to the opposite extreme, is the cardinal vice in the Populist doctrine. Out of this assumption springs the evil genius which has shaped the course of Colorado’s Populist administration.

In December, 1893, the Governor called a special session of the General Assembly. His principal purpose was to have a law enacted which should make foreign silver coins a legal tender in Colorado. With this was coupled a proposition that contracts payable in gold should be prohibited. It is unnecessary, perhaps, to say that these suggestions dropped still-born, and were by the legislature quickly consigned to oblivion.

The Populist policy of administration could be illustrated by numerous other acts of minor importance, but the foregoing are surely sufficient. That Colorado suffered in her credit abroad and in her enterprise and investments at home is but the necessary corollary—too intensely verified by actual experience. While all the world has suffered from causes which are world-wide, Colorado has had the additional burden arising from the spirit of anarchy fostered by executive authority.

Colorado is, however, rich in resources. This wealth of resources can be developed only by the harmonious cooperation of capital and labor. The existence of such natural sources of prosperity serves to strengthen among the people of Colorado a conservative and law-abiding spirit, and in no State of the Union will there be found a stronger spirit of business integrity and faithfulness in financial obligation than among those who bear the burden of taxation—state, county, and municipal. There was, therefore, a universal feeling of indignation prevalent in the State when it was found that, by the accident of 1892, there had been invoked the spirit of misrule, setting labor and capital at variance, breathing violence, and casting an odor of discredit upon the State. This feeling of indignation was especially strong in the cities and in the agricultural counties, where tremendous majorities were given against Governor Waite in the recent election. His defeat would have been far more overwhelming, except for the support he received from mining counties, a support which is sufficiently explained by facts already related.

In its State convention preceding the late election, the Republican [p.723] party declared: “That paramount issue in the State of Colorado is the suppression of the spirit of anarchy, the restoration and maintenance of law and order.” Upon this issue the battle was fought, and the victory won. The silver question was a minor issue, and rested on the proposition, asserted by the Republicans, that the people’s party is “the most insidious foe to the restoration of the free coinage of silver, in that its platform demands an extensive issue of paper money not based upon, or redeemable in, either gold or silver.”

The Eastern press makes an egregious error in assuming, as has frequently been done of late, that the Republican victory in Colorado denotes defeat of the silver cause. It does not imply the slightest diminution of bimetallic sentiment. Certainly, a party which wins its victory under the leadership of such men as Senator Teller and Senator Wolcott can hardly be said to have grown less zealous in the cause of bimetallism. The Republican party of Colorado believes in gold and silver coin as the legal-tender money of the country, and as the basis of currency issues. It looks with some amusement at the present proximity of extremes—the bankers at Baltimore and the Populists of the Farmers’ Alliance—the one advocating a paper currency based on stockholders’ liability and bank assets (for example, bank buildings, furniture and fixtures, and bills receivable) ; the other advocating a paper money issued on the security of “imperishable farm products,” such as wheat, cotton, and tobacco. It wonderingly inquires whether we shall depend in future for our money supplies “upon the quartz mills or the pulp mills of the country.” The combination of doctrines labelled “Populism” furnishes, however, no panacea for existing ills. Colorado is not likely to repeat her experiment in Populist government.

Joel F. Vaile